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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
The Blockbuster-Sony Music Entertainment Centre 
("E-Centre") is a music and entertainment facility located in 
Camden, New Jersey. An interior pavilion at the E-Centre 
provides fixed seating for 6,200 patrons, and an uncovered 
lawn area located behind the pavilion can accommodate 
approximately 18,000 spectators who either stand or sit on 
portable chairs or blankets. 
 
Appellant William Caruso, a Vietnam veteran who uses a 
wheelchair as a result of his disability, attended a concert 
at the E-Centre on July 13, 1995. The following day, 
Caruso and the Advocates for Disabled Americansfiled a 
complaint in federal district court alleging, inter alia, that 
the E-Center does not comply with Title III of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act (ADA), Pub.L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 
327 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. S 12181 et seq. (1994)), 
because: 1) the wheelchair areas in the pavilion do not 
provide wheelchair users with lines of sight over standing 
spectators and 2) the lawn area is not wheelchair 
accessible. The District Court granted summary judgment 
in favor of the defendants on both claims.1 We now affirm 
in part and reverse in part. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Before entering final judgment, the District Court granted a motion by 
the Paralyzed Veterans of America (PVA) to intervene as plaintiff solely 
for the purpose of appealing the District Court's ruling that the E-Centre 
does not need to provide wheelchair users sitting in the pavilion with 
lines of sight over standing spectators. 
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I. 
 
Title III of the ADA protects individuals against 
discrimination "on the basis of disability in the full and 
equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, 
advantages, or accommodations of any place of public 
accommodation." 42 U.S.C. S 12182 (a). Title III requires 
that newly constructed facilities be "readily accessible to 
and usable by individuals with disabilities, except where an 
entity can demonstrate that it is structurally 
impracticable." 42 U.S.C. S 12183. In order to carry out 
these provisions, Congress has directed the Department of 
Justice (DOJ) to "issue regulations . . . that include 
standards applicable to facilities" covered by Title III. 42 
U.S.C. 12186(b). Congress has further required that any 
standards included by the DOJ in its regulations"be 
consistent with the minimum guidelines and requirements 
issued by the Architectural and Transportation Barriers 
Compliance Board" ("Access Board"). 42 U.S.C. S 12186(c).2 
 
Pursuant to its statutory authority under Title III, the 
DOJ has issued numerous regulations, see 28 C.F.R. 
SS 36.101-36.608 (1998), one of which adopts the Access 
Board's guidelines as the DOJ's own Standards for New 
Construction and Alterations ("Standards"). See 28 CFR 
S 36.406 (referring to 28 C.F.R. S 36, App. A). Both of the 
issues in this case require us to interpret portions of the 
DOJ Standards. 
 
A. Lines of Sight 
 
Appellants contend that DOJ Standard 4.33.3, which was 
adopted after notice and comment, requires wheelchair 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The Access Board is a federal agency that was created by the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973. See 29 U.S.C. S 792(a). The Board is 
composed of 25 members: 13 public members appointed by the 
President, as well as officials of 12 federal agencies or departments. Id. 
The Board's mission focuses on the elimination of architectural, 
transportation, communication, and attitudinal barriers confronting 
people with disabilities. See 29 U.S.C. S 792(b). The ADA directed the 
Access Board to issue "minimum guidelines" to supplement the Board's 
existing Minimum Guidelines and Requirements for Accessible Design. 
42 U.S.C. S 12204)(a). 
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seats in the E-Center pavilion to afford sightlines over 
standing spectators. Standard 4.33.3 provides: 
 
       Placement of Wheelchair Locations. Wheelchair 
       areas shall be an integral part of any fixed seating plan 
       and shall be provided so as to provide people with 
       physical disabilities a choice of admission prices and 
       lines of sight comparable to those for members of the 
       general public. They shall adjoin an accessible route 
       that also serves as a means of egress in case of 
       emergency. At least one companion fixed seat shall be 
       provided next to each wheelchair seating area. When 
       the seating capacity exceeds 300, wheelchair spaces 
       shall be provided in more than one location. . . . 
 
28 C.F.R. S 36, App. A, 4.33.3. 
 
Appellants first argue that the plain meaning of the 
phrase "lines of sight comparable to those for members of 
the general public" requires that "if standing spectators can 
see the stage even when other patrons stand, wheelchair 
users, too, must be able to see the stage when other 
patrons stand." PVA Br. at 23. While this argument has 
considerable force, it does not account for the rest of the 
language in Standard 4.33.3, which helps the reader to 
place the phrase "lines of sight comparable" in context. 
Standard 4.33.3 is entitled "Placement of Wheelchair 
Locations" and includes at least two provisions concerning 
the dispersal of wheelchair locations in facilities with fixed 
seating plans.3 In addition, one of these dispersal provisions 
appears in the same sentence that contains the "lines of 
sight" requirement. Given this focus on the dispersal of 
wheelchair locations, it seems plausible to read the"lines of 
sight comparable" requirement as follows: if a facility's 
seating plan provides members of the general public with 
different lines of sight to the field or stage (e.g., lines of 
sight at a baseball game from behind the plate, on either 
side of the diamond, and from the outfield bleachers), it 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Appellants concede that the provisions in 4.33.3 requiring a "choice of 
admission prices" and "more than one location" when "the seating 
capacity exceeds 300" concern dispersal of wheelchair areas throughout 
a facility. See PVA Reply Br. at 7. 
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must also provide wheelchair users with a comparable 
opportunity to view the field or stage from a variety of angles.4 
 
Appellants reject this suggestion that the "lines of sight" 
provision might require dispersal rather than vertical 
enhancement, contending that such a reading would 
impermissibly render other portions of Standard 4.33.3 
superfluous. They argue: 
 
       Standard 4.33.3 . . . contains an explicit dispersal 
       provision, wholly independent of the "comparable" line 
       of sight provision. It requires, in pertinent part, that 
       "[w]heelchair areas . . . shall be provided so as to 
       provide persons with disabilities a choice of admission 
       prices." For facilities, such as modern sports and 
       entertainment venues, that offer tickets at a range of 
       prices depending on seating location, dispersal of 
       wheelchair locations is required by this provision. 
       Moreover, a requirement for dispersal is also derived 
       from the language in Standard 4.33.3 that "[w]hen the 
       seating capacity exceeds 300, wheelchair spaces shall 
       be provided in more than one location." Construing the 
       phrase "lines of sight comparable to those provided to 
       members of the general public" as simply requiring 
       dispersal of wheelchair locations, as the E-Centre 
       urges, is contrary to the plain language of that 
       regulation and would deprive important parts of the 
       regulation of any meaning. 
 
PVA Reply Br. at 6-7. This attempt to divorce the "lines of 
sight" requirement from the two provisions in 4.33.3 that 
are indisputably about dispersion overlooks the possibility 
that the three provisions are designed to work together so 
that: 1) at a minimum, facilities with over 300 seats provide 
at least two wheelchair locations and 2) larger facilities 
provide wheelchair users with the option of choosing from 
among seats that afford a variety of views for a variety of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Although not discussed by the E-Centre, there might be an additional, 
distinct reason for concluding that the language of Standard 4.33.3 does 
not clearly require sightlines over standing patrons: In light of the fact 
that Standard 4.33.3 concerns the design of "seating plans" and "seating 
areas," it seems entirely possible that the drafters were assuming seated 
spectators and not addressing the issue of standing patrons. 
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corresponding prices. Contrary to appellants' assertion, this 
second result is not accomplished by the "choice of 
admission prices" language alone. For, if Standard 4.33.3 is 
read in piecemeal fashion as appellants suggest, a facility, 
regardless of its size and the number of views that it offers 
to the general public, would be able to place all wheelchair 
users in just two locations so long at it offers some choice 
of prices in those locations. See Independent Living 
Resources v. Oregon Arena Corp., 982 F. Supp. 698, 743 
n.61 (D. Or. 1997). 
 
In the end, it seems that both interpretations of the "lines 
of sight" language are plausible and would provide some 
benefit to wheelchair users. Appellants' reading would 
benefit wheelchair users by allowing them to see when 
other patrons stand. The E-Centre's reading would benefit 
wheelchair users by providing them with a greater 
opportunity to view a performance or event from a variety 
of viewpoints. Since both readings of the rule are plausible 
and are consistent with the ADA's purpose of enabling 
people with disabilities to share equally in the benefits 
provided by a public accommodation, we conclude that the 
"lines of sight" language is ambiguous. 
 
Appellants' second contention is that, even if Standard 
4.33.3 is ambiguous, the court should follow the 
interpretation that has been given to the rule by the DOJ. 
See Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 
(1994) (explaining that an agency's interpretation of its own 
regulation "must be given controlling weight unless it is 
plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation") 
(internal quotations omitted); Menkowitz v. Pottstown 
Memorial Medical Center, 154 F.3d 113, 123 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(DOJ Technical Assistance Manual entitled to deference). 
But see id. at 525 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("giving 
substantive effect to . . . a hopelessly vague regulation . . . 
disserves the very purpose behind the delegation of 
lawmaking power to administrative agencies"); John F. 
Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to 
Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 
612 (1997)(urging reexamination of the principle of judicial 
deference to agency interpretations of regulations). 
Specifically, appellants rely on the following statement 
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appearing in a 1994 Supplement to the DOJ's Technical 
Assistance Manual (hereinafter "1994 TAM Supplement"): 
 
       In addition to requiring companion seating and 
       dispersion of wheelchair locations, [Standard 4.33.3] 
       requires that wheelchair locations provide people with 
       disabilities lines of sight comparable to those for 
       members of the general public. Thus, in assembly 
       areas where spectators can be expected to stand during 
       the event or show being viewed, the wheelchair 
       locations must provide lines of sight over spectators who 
       stand. This can be accomplished in many ways, 
       including placing wheelchair locations at the front of a 
       seating section, or by providing sufficient additional 
       elevation for wheelchair locations placed at the rear of 
       seating sections to allow those spectators to see over 
       the spectators who stand in front of them. 
 
1994 DOJ TAM Supp. P III-7.5180, Conditional App. at 49 
(emphasis added). 
 
In response, appellees maintain that the 1994 TAM 
Supplement is not an interpretive rule entitled to deference, 
but rather, an invalid attempt to adopt a new substantive 
requirement without notice and comment. The E-Centre 
bases this argument on the history of Standard 4.33.3, 
which, according to the E-Centre, reveals that the rule was 
not intended to address the issue of lines of sight over 
standing patrons. 
 
Standard 4.33.3 was originally proposed by the Access 
Board on January 22, 1991. At that time, the provision 
provided: 
 
       Placement of Wheelchair Locations. Wheelchair 
       areas shall be an integral part of any fixed seating plan 
       and shall be dispersed throughout the seating area. 
       They shall . . . be located to provide lines of sight 
       comparable to those for all viewing areas. 
 
56 Fed. Reg. 2380. In its public notice regarding the 
proposed rule, the Access Board explicitly invited comments 
on the issue of sightlines over standing spectators: 
 
       Section 4.33.3 provides that seating locations for 
       people who use wheelchairs shall be dispersed 
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       throughout the seating area and shall be located to 
       provide lines of sight comparable to those for all 
       viewing areas. This requirement appears to be adequate 
       for theaters and concert halls, but may not suffice in 
       sports arenas or race tracks where the audience 
       frequently stands throughout a large portion of the game 
       or event. In alterations of existing sports arenas, 
       accessible spaces are frequently provided at the lower 
       part of a seating tier projecting out above a lower 
       seating tier or are built out over existing seats at the 
       top of a tier providing a great differential in height. 
       These solutions can work in newly constructed sports 
       arenas as well, if sight lines relative to standing 
       patrons are considered at the time of the initial design. 
       The Board seeks comments on whether full lines of 
       sight over standing spectators in sports arenas and 
       other similar assembly areas should be required. 
 
56 Fed. Reg. 2314 (emphasis added). 
 
On February 22, 1991, the DOJ published a notice in 
which it proposed to adopt the Access Board's Proposed 
Guidelines "with any amendments made by the [Access 
Board] during the rulemaking process." 56 Fed. Reg. 7478- 
79. The DOJ notice stated that "any comments" on the 
Access Board's Proposed Guidelines should be sent directly 
to the Board. Id. at 7479. 
 
On July 26, 1991, the Access Board announced its 
proposed final guidelines. Along with the guidelines, the 
Board published commentary, including two passages 
relevant to the meaning of the "lines of sight comparable" 
language in 4.33.3. First, the Board gave the following 
response to comments on dispersal: 
 
       Response. The requirements in 4.33.3 for dispersal of 
       wheelchair seating spaces have been modified. 
       Wheelchair seating spaces must be an integral part of 
       any fixed seating plan and be situated so as to provide 
       wheelchair users a choice of admission prices and lines 
       of sight comparable to those available to the rest of the 
       public. . . . 
 
56 Fed Reg. 35440. By discussing the "lines of sight" 
requirement in the section of the commentary concerning 
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dispersal, the Board appeared to be indicating that it was 
treating this requirement, like the choice of price 
requirement, as a dispersal requirement. The Board then 
went on to consider the issue of sightlines over standing 
patrons in a separate section of the commentary: 
 
        Comment. The [Board] asked questions reg arding 
       . . . lines of sight over standing spectators in sports 
       arenas and other similar assembly areas. . . . Many 
       commenters . . . recommended that lines of sight 
       should be provided over standing spectators. 
 
        Response. . . . The issue of lines of sight over 
       standing spectators will be addressed in guidelines 5 for 
       recreational facilities. 
 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 
On the same day that the Access Board issued its 
proposed guidelines, including the above comment and 
response seemingly deferring the issue of standing lines of 
sight, the DOJ promulgated Standard 4.33.3, which is 
worded identically to the Access Board's final proposed text, 
which addressed the sight-line issue. Unlike the Board, the 
Department did not initially express a view in its 
commentary on the issue of sightlines over standing 
spectators. Rather, in explaining its adoption of the Access 
Board's guidelines, the DOJ made the following general 
statement: 
 
       The Department put the public on notice, through the 
       proposed rule, of its intention to adopt the proposed 
       [guidelines], with any changes made by the Board, as 
       the accessibility standards. As a member of the Board 
       and of its ADA Task Force, the Department 
       participated actively in the public hearings held on the 
       proposed guidelines and in preparation of both the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. It is important to note the difference between Access Board guidelines 
and DOJ guidelines. For the Access Board, guidelines are the 
substantive rules they develop and promulgate. Thus, in speaking of a 
future guideline, the Board was not referring to a future interpretation 
of 
4.33.3, but rather, a separate substantive rule it would develop. By 
contrast, a DOJ guideline is an interpretation of a substantive rule, not 
the substantive rule itself. 
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       proposed and final versions of [the guidelines] . . . [All] 
       comments on the Department's proposed rule . . . have 
       been addressed adequately in the final [guidelines]. 
       Largely in response to comments, the Board made 
       numerous changes from its proposal. 
 
28 C.F.R. S 36, App. B, at 632-33. 
 
The next discussion of the sightlines issue came in a 
1992 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking published by the 
Access Board. There the Board summarized what had 
occurred during the 1991 notice and comment period with 
regard to 4.33.3 and expressed its future intentions: 
 
        During the initial rulemaking, the Board requested 
       information on lines of sight at seating locations for 
       persons who use wheelchairs. . . . An overwhelming 
       majority of responses favored including a provision 
       requiring lines of sight over standing spectators in 
       sports arenas and other similar assembly areas. A few 
       commenters opposed such a provision because it 
       would be either unenforceable, add significant cost or 
       reduce seating capacity. . . . The Board intends to 
       address the issue of lines of sight over standing 
       spectators in the guidelines for recreational facilities 
       which will be proposed at a future date. 
 
        Question 17: The Board is seeking comments on the 
       design issues associated with providing integrated and 
       dispersed accessible seating locations with a clear line 
       of sight over standing spectators in arenas, stadiums or 
       other sports facilities. Clearly, not all seats in sports 
       facilities afford clear lines of sight over standing 
       spectators. Tall persons, guard railings or otherfixed 
       elements in the facility may block one's view of the 
       playing field. However, since persons with disabilities 
       have fewer choices of seating locations, should all the 
       accessible seating locations be required to have lines of 
       sight over standing spectators? Would such a 
       requirement compromise the requirement for dispersed 
       wheelchair seating by providing seating in fewer 
       locations? If maximum dispersal of accessible seating 
       locations is provided, what percentage of such locations 
       can be provided with a clear line of sight over standing 
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       spectators? The Board encourages commenters to 
       provide cost information and examples (including 
       drawings, pictures or slides) of sports facilities where 
       the accessible seating locations are dispersed, 
       integrated and provide clear lines of sight over standing 
       spectators. 
 
57 Fed. Reg. 60618 (emphasis added). 
 
Based on this regulatory history, the E-Centre contends 
that Standard 4.33.3 was intended to leave unresolved the 
issue of lines of sight over standing spectators, and, as a 
result, the DOJ was not entitled to "interpret" Standard 
4.33.3 in 1994 in a fashion that did resolve the issue of 
sightlines over standing spectators. Cf. Thomas Jefferson 
Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994) (courts need not 
defer to an agency's interpretation of its own regulation if 
an "alternative reading is compelled by . . . indications of 
the [agency's] intent at the time of the regulation's 
promulgation"). The E-Centre maintains that, if the DOJ 
wanted to impose a new requirement that wheelchair users 
be able to see over standing patrons, it had to engage in 
notice and comment, since such a requirement would 
constitute a new substantive rule. See 5 U.S.C. S 553 (b) & 
(c) (notice and comment procedure required for substantive 
rules but not interpretive rules); DIA Navigation Co. v. 
Pomeroy, 34 F.3d 1255, 1264 (3d Cir. 1994) (explaining 
that a rule is substantive if "the agency intends to create 
new law, rights or duties"). 
 
Appellants dispute the E-Centre's characterization of the 
1994 DOJ statement as a "substantive" rule. They argue 
that, because the DOJ did not explicitly adopt the Access 
Board's commentary, the meaning of Standard 4.33.3 was 
not limited by that commentary when it was adopted, and 
thus the 1994 statement does not constitute a "change" in 
the requirements under 4.33.3. They also maintain that 
even if the Access Board's commentary can be attributed to 
the DOJ, the DOJ was entitled to change its interpretation 
of Standard 4.33.3 in 1994 without notice and comment. 
 
With regard to the threshold question of whether the 
Access Board's commentary can be attributed to the DOJ, 
the appellants rely on the District of Columbia Circuit's 
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analysis in Paralyzed Veterans of America v. D.C. Arena 
L.P., 117 F.3d 579 (D.C. Cir. 1997): 
 
       If the Department, when it promulgated the regulation, 
       had said what the Board said, or even clearly adopted 
       what the Board said, it would be hard to conclude that 
       the Department did not subsequently "amend" the 
       regulation in violation of the APA. But Justice did not 
       do so in its statement of basis and purpose. It never 
       referred to the Board's concern, nor did it imply that its 
       regulation did not address the problem of lines of sight 
       over standing spectators. It may well be that it is a 
       plausible inference that Justice, at the time, 
       deliberately intended the regulation to mean the same 
       thing as did the Board -- but it is not a necessary 
       inference. . . . We admit the issue is not easy; 
       appellants almost but do not quite establish that the 
       Department significantly changed its interpretation of 
       the regulation when it issued the 1994 technical 
       manual. 
 
Id. at 587. 
 
The problem with this analysis is that it results in a 
conclusion that the DOJ, while aware that its proposed rule 
was ambiguous as to an issue of concern to many 
commenters,6 both: 1) adopted the proposed rule without 
offering any explanation as to how it resolved the disputed 
issue; and 2) later resolved the dispute by way of 
interpretation. This result would violate an important 
principle discussed in the Paralyzed Veterans opinion: 
 
       It is certainly not open to an agency to promulgate 
       mush and then give it concrete form only through 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. In its own commentary to Standard 4.33.3, the DOJ stated that it had 
"thoroughly analyzed" all of the comments received by the Board 
regarding its proposed guidelines. See 28 C.F.R. S 36, App. B, at 632. 
The Access Board's commentary makes clear that, in response to its 
statement that 4.33.3 "may not suffice" to provide lines of sight over 
standing spectators, "many" comments were received, 56 Fed. Reg. 
35440, with a majority favoring the inclusion of"a provision requiring 
lines of sight over standing spectators," but a few opposing such a 
provision "because it would be either unenforceable, add significant cost 
or reduce seating capacity." 57 Fed. Reg. 60618. 
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       subsequent less formal "interpretations." That 
       technique would circumvent section 553, the notice 
       and comment procedures of the APA. 
 
Id. at 584. While the Paralyzed Veterans court concluded 
that the DOJ's promulgation of 4.33.3 did not violate this 
principle, id. at 584-85,7 we must respectfully disagree. If 
this principle is ever violated, it would seem to be when an 
agency knows it is promulgating a rule that is ambiguous 
on a substantive issue of concern to commenters, and later 
tries to resolve the issue through an interpretive rule. 
 
Rather than concluding that the DOJ consciously chose 
to ignore a substantive issue regarding 4.33.3 that was 
raised in the Access Board's notice of proposed rulemaking 
and debated by commenters, we conclude that the DOJ 
implicitly adopted the Access Board's analysis of 4.33.3. 
This conclusion is strongly supported by the following 
factors: 1) the DOJ referred all comments to the Board; 2) 
the DOJ relied on the Board to make adequate changes 
based on those comments; 3) the Board specifically 
changed the language of 4.33.3 in response to comments 
and explained that change in its commentary; 4) the DOJ 
was a "member of the Board" and "participated actively . . . 
in preparation of both the proposed and final versions of 
the [guidelines]," 28 CFR Part 36, App. B, at 632; and 5) 
the DOJ's commentary stated that the final guidelines 
promulgated by the Board adequately addressed all 
comments. Accord Independent Living Resources v. Oregon 
Arena Corporation, 982 F. Supp. 698, 741 (D. Or. 1997). 
 
If the Access Board's views on 4.33.3 are attributed to 
the DOJ, the remaining questions are: 1) whether these 
views are inconsistent with the 1994 DOJ TAM 
interpretation, and 2) whether such an inconsistency 
renders the 1994 DOJ TAM interpretation invalid. With 
regard to the first question, the Access Board's commentary 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The D.C. Circuit additionally relied on the fact that the defendants in 
that case did not press the argument that Standard 4.33.3 constituted 
"mush." Id. In the instant case, by contrast, the E-Centre has argued 
that the DOJ's rule would be impermissibly vague on the issue of 
sightlines if the Access Board's commentary were not attributed to the 
DOJ. See Appellees' Br. at 33. 
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treated the "lines of sight" language in 4.33.3 as a dispersal 
provision while expressly deferring the issue of views over 
standing patrons. See 56 Fed. Reg. 35440. Thus, as 
interpreted by the Board, the "lines of sight comparable" 
language requires dispersal of wheelchair seats but does 
not address elevation of wheelchair seats to allow 
wheelchair users to see over standing spectators. By 
contrast, the 1994 TAM Supplement interprets 4.33.3 as 
requiring lines of sight over spectators who stand. Thus, 
the DOJ's interpretation is inconsistent with the Access 
Board's interpretation in that it imposes a requirement that 
had not previously existed. 
 
Turning to the issue of an agency's ability to reinterpret 
an ambiguous regulation, we agree with the District of 
Columbia Circuit's discussion of this question in Paralyzed 
Veterans. In that case, the court rejected the DOJ's 
argument that "an agency is completely free to change its 
interpretation of an ambiguous regulation so long as the 
regulation reasonably will bear the second interpretation." 
117 F.3d at 586. The court explained: 
 
       The government argues that an agency has the same 
       latitude to modify its interpretation of a regulation as 
       it does its interpretation of a statute under Chevron. 
       We think the government is wrong. . . . Under the APA, 
       agencies are obliged to engage in notice and comment 
       before formulating regulations, which applies as well to 
       "repeals" or "amendments." See 5 U.S.C. S 551(5). To 
       allow an agency to make a fundamental change in its 
       interpretation of a substantive regulation without notice 
       and comment obviously would undermine those APA 
       requirements. That is surely why the Supreme Court 
       has noted (in dicta) that APA rulemaking is required 
       where an interpretation "adopt[s] a new position 
       inconsistent with . . . existing regulations." Shalala v. 
       Guernsey Memorial Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 100 (1995). 
 
Paralyzed Veterans, 117 F.3d at 586 (emphasis added).8 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Notwithstanding this principle, the Paralyzed Veterans court did not 
invalidate the interpretation in the 1994 TAM Supplement because it 
ultimately concluded that the Access Board's interpretation of 4.33.3, 
while probably inconsistent with the DOJ 1994 Tam Supplement 
interpretation, was not attributable to the DOJ. 117 F.3d at 587. 
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See also Syncor Intern. Corp. v. Shalala, 127 F.3d 90, 94-95 
(D.C. Cir. 1997) (dicta) (same).9 
 
Appellants contend that this court should not follow the 
District of Columbia Circuit's view because it is contrary to 
Supreme Court and Third Circuit cases that allow agencies 
to change their interpretations of regulations. See PVA Br. 
at 38-43 & n.22. Most of the cases cited by the appellants, 
however, concern agency interpretations of statutes, not 
regulations.10 As for the cited cases that do discuss an 
agency's ability to change its mind about a regulation, they 
are readily distinguishable from the circumstances 
contemplated by the District of Columbia Circuit and 
present in the instant case. First, appellants rely on the 
Supreme Court's statement in a recent Medicare case that 
the Secretary of Health and Human Services was "not 
estopped from changing a view she believe[d] to have been 
grounded on a mistaken legal interpretation" of a 
regulation. Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 
504, 517 (dicta).11 However, the inconsistency in Thomas 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. The District Court in the instant case used similar reasoning to 
conclude that the interpretation in the 1994 TAM Supplement was 
invalid due to the lack of notice and comment: 
 
       When the "legislative history" of an administrative regulation 
evinces 
       an intent not to cover a certain subject matter, the notice-and- 
       comment requirements of the APA cannot be evaded merely by 
       interpreting an existing regulation to cover subject matter 
       consciously omitted from its scope. 
 
968 F. Supp. 210, 216 (D.N.J. 1997). 
 
10. See Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735, 742 (1996); Good Samaritan 
Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402, 417 (1993); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 
173, 186 (1991); Sacred Heart Medical Center v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 537, 
544 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 
11. This statement is dicta because the Court had already concluded 
earlier in its opinion that "petitioner fail[ed] to present persuasive 
evidence that the Secretary has interpreted the[regulation] in an 
inconsistent manner." Id. at 515. 
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Jefferson did not involve a "fundamental change" of a prior 
interpretation that had general applicability, but rather, an 
agency's adoption of a position that was arguably 
inconsistent with some past actions taken by the Secretary 
in individual cases. See id. at 517. Appellants also rely on 
our decision in C.K. v. New Jersey Dep't of Health and 
Human Services, 92 F.3d 171 (3d Cir. 1996), for the 
proposition that an agency head, "in her discretion, is 
allowed to change her mind over time regarding the wisdom 
of certain programs." Id. at 187. C.K., however, involved 
inconsistent waiver decisions by an agency head who had 
been given the statutory authority to waive certain 
requirements. Thus, like Thomas Jefferson, it did not 
address the situation where an agency publicly announces 
one interpretation of a regulation that will presumably be 
applied to all covered parties and then attempts to 
fundamentally change that interpretation. Finally, 
appellants rely on this court's decision in Beazer East, Inc. 
v. EPA, 963 F.2d 603 (3d Cir. 1992), for the proposition 
that "nothing in the APA prohibits an agency from adopting 
or revising an interpretation of a regulation that has been 
properly promulgated in an adjudication and applying that 
interpretation retroactively." Id. at 609. Beazer East is 
distinguishable from the instant case for two reasons. First, 
it involved agency adjudication, which is governed by 
different principles than rulemaking. See id. at 609. 
Second, while the Beazer East court did state that agencies 
could adopt or revise their substantive rules in 
adjudication, it made clear that it was not dealing with a 
situation where "the agency inconsistency interpreted a 
standard over time or changed its interpretation." Id. at 
610. In fact, the court went on to explain that, if a new 
interpretation that is inconsistent with past interpretations 
"effectively imposes additional substantive requirements on 
the regulated community, it should be placed directly in the 
regulations. The regulations would then be subject to notice 
and comment, with appropriate participation by the 
regulated community." Id. at 611 n.7 (dicta). This statement 
is entirely consistent with the District of Columbia Circuit's 
conclusion that an agency cannot effect a "fundamental 
change in its interpretation of a substantive regulation 
without notice and comment. . . ." Paralyzed Veterans, 117 
F.3d at 586. 
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Taken together, the cases indicate that agencies can alter 
the interpretation of their regulations in modest ways 
without requiring notice and comment. However, if an 
agency's new interpretation will result in significantly 
different rights and duties than existed under a prior 
interpretation, notice and comment is required. This 
distinction, which is not precise, is akin to the distinction 
that is generally made between substantive and interpretive 
rules. See DIA Navigation Co. v. Pomeroy, 34 F.3d 1255, 
1264 (3d Cir. 1994) (although the line between substantive 
and interpretive rules is "incapable of being drawn with 
much analytical precision," and the tests formulated to 
draw the line "are often circular," the "basic determination 
. . . involves whether . . . the agency intends to create new 
law, rights or duties") (quotations omitted). In that context, 
we have indicated that it is "helpful to analyze a rule with 
an eye to the policies animating the APA's notice and 
comment requirement." Id. at 1265. "The essential purpose 
of according S 553 notice and comment opportunities is to 
reintroduce public participation and fairness to affected 
parties after governmental authority has been delegated to 
unrepresentative agencies." Id. (quotations omitted). 
 
In the instant case, the public was invited to discuss a 
certain issue during a notice and comment period, and 
comments were submitted on both sides of the issue. The 
public was then told that the issue would not be resolved 
by the adopted rules. A year later, the public was told that 
a rule resolving the issue would be "proposed at a future 
date." 57 Fed. Reg. 60618. However, three years after the 
initial rules were adopted, the DOJ announced, without 
explanation and without engaging in notice and comment, 
that it would interpret the initial rules as resolving the 
issue that had previously been left open. Such behavior is 
unfair to those who relied on agency statements that the 
issue was not being resolved by the initial rules and 
interpreting the regulation as resolving the issue that it 
seemed plainly to have eschewed. Accordingly, we conclude 
that the DOJ's 1994 reinterpretation constituted a 
"fundamental change" in interpretation that could only be 
made by adopting a substantive rule pursuant to notice 
and comment. Since the DOJ has not followed the notice 
and comment procedures, we conclude that the E-Centre 
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did not violate the ADA by failing to provide wheelchair 
users with sightlines over standing patrons. If DOJ believes 
that the ADA should be interpreted to require that 
wheelchair users be given lines of sight equivalent to 
standing patrons -- and such a rule certainly has much to 
recommend it -- the DOJ can accomplish this end through 
notice-and-comment rulemaking. Indeed, the DOJ probably 
could have achieved this end already had it followed that 
course initially. 
 
B. Access to the Lawn Area 
 
Appellants' second contention is that the E-Centre does 
not comply with the ADA because there is no wheelchair 
access to the lawn area.12 In relevant part, Title III requires 
that the facilities of a public accommodation be"readily 
accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, 
except where an entity can demonstrate that it is 
structurally impracticable." 42 U.S.C. S 12183(a)(i). To 
implement this mandate, the DOJ has adopted a regulation 
requiring that "[a]t least one accessible route . . . connect 
accessible buildings, accessible facilities, accessible 
elements, and accessible spaces that are on the same site." 
Standard 4.1.2(3) (emphasis added). Consistent with this 
provision, the appellants seek "at least one wheelchair lift 
to . . . provide access to the lawn area from the two outdoor 
plazas." J.A. at 90 (Paradigm Report). See also Appellants' 
Br. at 13 (arguing that "if a ramp were built to the lawn 
area there would be greater integration of the facility"). The 
E-Centre would appear obligated to provide such access 
unless it can demonstrate structural impracticability. 
 
The DOJ has explained in its regulations that the 
structural impracticability exception is reserved for "those 
rare circumstances when the unique characteristics of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. Before the District Court, Caruso also argued that the E-Centre had 
to include the capacity of the lawn area (18,000) in its calculations of 
how many wheelchair locations to provide. The District Court rejected 
this argument on the ground that DOJ Standard 4.1.3(19), which 
requires that the number of wheelchair locations be equal to 1% + 1 of 
a facility's capacity, only applies to assembly areas with "fixed 
seating." 
968 F. Supp. at 218. Caruso has not challenged this ruling on appeal. 
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terrain prevent the incorporation of accessibility features." 
28 C.F.R. S 36.401(c). Additional guidance, some of which is 
directly on point, can be found in the DOJ commentary 
that was published with the regulations: 
 
        Consistent with the legislative history of the ADA, 
       this narrow exception will apply only in rare and 
       unusual circumstances where unique characteristics of 
       terrain make accessibility unusually difficult. . . . 
       Almost all commenters supported this interpretation. 
       Two commenters argued that the DOJ requirement is too 
       limiting . . . . These commenters suggested consistency 
       with HUD's Fair Housing Accessibility Guidelines, which 
       generally would allow exceptions from accessibility 
       requirements, or allow compliance with less stringent 
       requirements, on sites with slopes exceeding 10%. 
 
        The Department is aware of the provisions in HUD's 
       guidelines . . . . The approach taken in these 
       guidelines, which apply to different types of 
       construction and implement different statutory 
       requirements for new construction, does not bind this 
       Department in regulating under the ADA. . . . 
 
        The limited structural impracticability exception 
       means that it is acceptable to deviate from accessibility 
       requirements only where unique characteristics of 
       terrain prevent the incorporation of accessibility 
       features and where providing accessibility would 
       destroy the physical integrity of a facility. A situation in 
       which a building must be built on stilts because of its 
       location in marshlands or over water is an example of 
       one of the few situations in which the exception for 
       structural impracticability would apply. 
 
        This exception to accessibility requirements should not 
       be applied to situations in which a facility is located in 
       "hilly" terrain or on a plot of land upon which there are 
       steep grades. In such circumstances, accessibility can 
       be achieved without destroying the physical integrity of 
       a structure, and is required in the construction of new 
       facilities. 
 
28 C.F.R. S 36, App. B., at 649 (emphasis added). 
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This passage indicates that public accommodations 
cannot demonstrate structural impracticability merely by 
providing evidence of a slope of over 10%. Yet, this is 
precisely how the E-Centre tries to show that "it is 
impossible to make the lawn area wheelchair accessible." 
Appellees' Br. at 48-49 (relying solely on the fact that the 
lawn area has a slope ranging from 12-15%). The E-Centre 
has presented no argument as to why it cannot provide a 
ramp or a lift that would enable wheelchair users to reach 
the lawn area.13 Moreover, Caruso has introduced affidavits 
from people who have visited other concert venues with 
sloping grass areas that are wheelchair accessible. J.A. 
210-11. 
 
Not surprisingly, the E-Centre does not focus on the 
"structural impracticability" issue, and instead presses two 
other arguments. First, it contends that it need not provide 
wheelchair access to the lawn area because the DOJ 
Standards only require wheelchair seating to be provided 
when there is fixed seating for the general public. See 
Appellees' Br. at 46-47; see DOJ Standard 4.1.3 (19). This 
argument, however, misconstrues the issue being appealed. 
Caruso is not asking that the E-Centre be required to 
construct wheelchair seating areas on the lawn that comply 
with the various requirements governing fixed seating plans.14 
Rather, he is merely seeking an accessible route to the lawn 
area. Caruso is entitled to such a route under the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. The E-Centre incorrectly asserts that the Standards prohibit ramps 
to have a slope of more than 2%. The correct figure is 8.3%. Standard 
4.8.2. In any event, this number is irrelevant. Caruso is not asking for 
a ramp that runs up the lawn area. Rather, he merely wants a ramp or 
lift that will provide him with access to the lawn area. 
 
14. Thus, there is no basis for the E-Centre's fear that it will have to 
"flatten the lawn area, cover it in concrete, and divide it into seating 
rows 
to make it wheelchair accessible." See Appellee's Br. at 49. In fact, it 
is 
unlikely that such a requirement could ever be imposed under the ADA 
since Title III specifically provides that facilities can refrain from 
making 
modifications that "would fundamentally alter the nature of such . . . 
facilities." 42 U.S.C. S 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii). In any event, Caruso has made 
it clear that he is not seeking access to the lawn areas so that he can 
sit in his wheelchair on a concrete slab. Rather, he desires access so 
that he can "enjoy a concert on [the] grass or a blanket" while picnicking 
with family and friends. Appellants' Br. at 13. 
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regulations regardless of whether or not the facility is also 
required to meet the more specific DOJ Standards 
concerning fixed seating plans. See 28 C.F.R. S 36.401(c)(2) 
("[A]ny portion of the facility that can be made accessible 
shall be made accessible to the extent that is not 
structurally impracticable."); id., S 36, App. A, Standard 
4.1.1(5)(a) (same); id. Standard 4.1.2(2) ("At least one 
accessible route . . . shall connect . . . accessible spaces 
that are on the same site."). Accordingly, we reject the 
argument that assembly areas without fixed seating need 
not provide access to people in wheelchairs. 
 
The E-Centre's other justification for failing to provide 
access is based on the "Equivalent Facilitation" provision in 
the DOJ Standards. It states: 
 
       Departures from particular technical and scoping 
       requirements of this guideline by the use of other 
       designs and technologies are permitted where the 
       alternative designs and technologies used will provide 
       substantially equivalent or greater access to and 
       usability of the facility. 
 
DOJ Standard 2.2. The E-Centre contends that it has 
provided "equivalent facilitation" for wheelchair users by 
placing additional wheelchair locations in the interior 
pavilion. See Appellees' Br. at 47-50. The District Court 
agreed and granted summary judgment for the E-Centre on 
this basis. 
 
The principal problem with the E-Centre's "equivalent 
facilitation" argument is that it treats the ADA's 
requirement of equal access for people with disabilities as 
a "particular technical and scoping requirement." This is 
simply not the case. Rather, equal access is an explicit 
requirement of both the statute itself and the general 
provisions of the DOJ's regulations. See 42 U.S.C. S 12183; 
28 C.F.R. S 36.401. Properly read, the "Equivalent 
Facilitation" provision does not allow facilities to deny 
access under certain circumstances, but instead allows 
facilities to bypass the technical requirements laid out in 
the Standards when alternative designs will provide 
"equivalent or greater access to and usability of the facility." 
Therefore, we conclude that the E-Centre cannot rely on the 
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"Equivalent Facilitation" provision to excuse its failure to 
provide any wheelchair access to an assembly area that 
accommodates 18,000 people. 
 
Furthermore, as noted by Caruso in his appellate brief, 
the language of Title III itself precludes a reading of the 
"Equivalent Facilitation" provision that would allow venues 
to restrict wheelchair access to certain areas based on a 
belief that wheelchair users will be better off elsewhere. See 
42 U.S.C. S 12182 (b)(1)(A)(iii) (discriminatory to provide a 
separate benefit unless necessary to provide equal benefit); 
id. at (b)(1)(B) (benefits of a public accommodation must be 
provided in the most integrated setting appropriate to the 
needs of the individual). As the DOJ explains in its 
commentary: 
 
       Taken together, [the statutory and regulatory 
       provisions concerning separate benefits and integrated 
       settings] are intended to prohibit exclusion and 
       segregation of individuals with disabilities and the 
       denial of equal opportunities enjoyed by others, based 
       on, among other things, presumptions, patronizing 
       attitudes, fears, and stereotypes about individuals with 
       disabilities. Consistent with these standards, public 
       accommodations are required to make decisions based 
       on facts applicable to individuals and not on the basis 
       of presumptions as to what a class of individuals with 
       disabilities can or cannot do. . . . Separate, special, or 
       different programs that are designed to provide a 
       benefit to persons with disabilities cannot be used to 
       restrict the participation of persons with disabilities in 
       general, integrated activities. 
 
28 C.F.R. S 36, App. B., at 622. 
 
The District Court, in concluding that the E-Centre had 
not violated Title III by failing to provide access to the lawn 
area, appeared to give precisely the type of justification that 
the DOJ commentary finds repugnant to the ADA: 
 
       The E-Centre provides the disabled with higher quality 
       (i.e. closer) seats in the pavilion for the same price as 
       lawn seats. Plaintiffs do not offer any reasons why the 
       interior seats are not equivalent or superior to lawn 
       seating. In our view, the E-Centre provides equal, if not 
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       greater, access to its facility for wheelchair users in the 
       interior than it does for non-wheelchair users on the 
       lawn. 
 
968 F. Supp. at 218. On appeal, the E-Centre reiterates 
this argument that it is acceptable to restrict wheelchair 
users from the lawn area because they provide "higher 
quality (i.e. closer) seats in the pavilion." Appellees' Br. at 
49. We reject this contention as inconsistent with the plain 
language of Title III. See 42 U.S.C.S 12182(b)(1)(c) 
("Notwithstanding the existence of separate or different 
programs or activities . . . an individual with a disability 
shall not be denied the opportunity to participate in such 
programs or activities that are not separate or different."). 
We further conclude that the only way the E-Centre can 
justify its failure to provide access to the lawn area is by 
showing structural impracticability. Since the E-Centre has 
not yet made such a showing, we reverse the grant of 
summary judgment on Caruso's lawn-access claim and 
remand for further proceedings related to this claim. 
 
II. 
 
For the reasons explained above, we affirm the decision 
of the District Court in part, and we reverse in part, and we 
remand for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
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